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PAUL CLEMENT AND
THE STATE OF CONSERVATIVE LEGAL THOUGHT
SAM SINGERt
ABSTRACT

If 2011 is remembered as the year the states stood up to the Obama
Administration and its bold vision of federal power, Paul Clement will be
remembered as the lawyer they chose to make their case to the Supreme
Court. In addition to the healthcare challenge, Clement appeared on behalf of Arizona in defense of the State's sweeping new immigration law
and helped Texas defend its new electoral map against interference from
the federal courts. Along the way, he became the go-to lawyer for the
"states' rights" cause-a "shadow Solicitor General" leading the states in
their push to reclaim power from the federal government.
This Essay reconciles the perception of Paul Clement as a champion
of states' rights with his less-visible work on behalf of the business
community-work that, because of the pro-federal slant of the business
agenda, often puts him at odds with the states' rights movement. I will
demonstrate that, despite the publicity he has gained for his high-profile
federalism cases, Clement has done more than most private lawyers in
recent memory to undercut the states' rights agenda. More broadly, I will
argue that the tension within his caseload-the push and pull between
federalism and deregulation-reflects a broader rift within the conservative legal movement. Exploring this rift through the lens of Clement's
work, I will consider whether legal conservatism can still embrace the
conflicting tenets of federalism and deregulation.
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Last February, in a letter to the Speaker of the House, Attorney
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doning its defense of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), the federal
law that defines marriage as the legal union between a man and a woman
and lets states ignore same-sex unions classified as marriage by other
states.' Although the Obama Administration had defended DOMA in
several prior challenges, it was only in recognition of the Justice Department's longstanding practice of defending duly enacted statutes
against legal attack, and then only in jurisdictions where judicial precedent allowed it to mount a plausible defense without taking a position on
how closely courts should scrutinize laws that burden the gay community. Now that challenges were pending in jurisdictions where the law is in
flux, the Attorney General explained, the Justice Department would be
required to take an affirmative position on the appropriate level of scrutiny, and the President was unwilling to take a stance contrary to his firm
belief that DOMA is unconstitutional as applied to same-sex couples
who are legally married under state law.2 The Attorney General would go
into further detail about the legality of DOMA and the Justice Department's authority to withdraw support from unconstitutional statutes, but
the thrust of his message to Congress was clear: We don't like this law,
and we've exhausted every professionally responsible argument that can
be made in its defense; it's your problem now. 3
The Holder letter was the first strike in a still-evolving conflict between the White House and House Republicans over the fate of DOMA
in the courts. Republicans blasted the move as irresponsible and ill motivated, accusing the President of shirking the Justice Department's obligation to defend congressional enactments. 4 By forcing the Justice Department to abandon this role, critics asserted, the White House was not only
attacking DOMA, it was attacking the constitutional prerogatives of
Congress. Worse yet, the White House was making an end run around
the legislative process by using the Justice Department to effect an unauthorized veto.6
With the Justice Department out of the picture, it fell to Congress,
and specifically to Republican leaders of the House of Representatives,
to make provisions for DOMA's defense. House Speaker John Boehner
agreed to intervene in the lawsuit and defend the law in his capacity as
Speaker. He retained Paul Clement, a Solicitor General under President
1. Letter from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, to John Boehner, Speaker of the House of
Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/20 1/February/lI -ag223.html.
2. Id.
3. Id
4.
David Baumann, House Republicans Blast Holder on DOMA; Say DOJ Should Pay,
MAIN JUSTICE (May 3, 2011, 11:36 AM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2011/05/03/house-judiciaryrepublicans-blast-holder-on-domal.
5.
David Badash, NOM's Maggie GallagherCalls Obama's DOMA Position an "End-Run,"
NEW C.R. MOVEMENT (Feb. 23, 2011), http://thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/noms-maggiegallagher-calls-obamas-doma-position-an-end-run/legal-issues/2011/02/23/17606.
6. Id.
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George W. Bush and one of the more sought-after lawyers in the Washington legal community. Boehner had originally threatened to slash the
Justice Department's budget to free up money for Clement's contract,
which his firm, King & Spalding, had accepted at a considerable discount. When that road proved impassable (and most likely illegal), he
scraped together funds, now said to total three quarters of $1 million,
from an internal network of House accounts.
That Boehner would turn to Clement for such a momentous case
came as a surprise to nobody. There may be two dozen lawyers in the
United States who possess credentials commensurate with a case of this
magnitude. The number gets smaller if you factor in lawyers with experience defending federal legislation, and approaches zero if you limit it to
those with conservative bona fides. Having served at the helm of the
Bush Justice Department for eight years, the final four as Solicitor General; having argued before the Supreme Court on more than fifty occasions, many of them for matters of rich historic significance like abortion
and campaign finance and the President's conduct of the war on terrorism; and having earned a reputation as a gifted advocate with the ear of
the Justices and an aptitude for winning big cases, Clement easily met all
three criteria.
But what really sets Clement apart from other elite constitutional
lawyers is his knack for avoiding controversy. Among the few lawyers to
leave the Bush Administration with a better reputation than he entered
with, Clement is in the enviable position of having worked at the helm of
one of the more polarizing Justice Department's in the modern era yet
having no reputational scars to speak of. This is due in part to the positions he took behind closed doors, where he is said to have clashed with
more hawkish Justice Department officials over the scope of the President's counterterrorism powers. But Clement is also emphatically likeable, a Midwesterner known inside Washington as a scrupulous lawyer for
whom politics takes a backseat to the rule of law. As Walter Dellinger,
who served as Solicitor General under President Bill Clinton, told the
New York Times, "Paul is such a good advocate and such a cheerful
friend that it's easy to forget how conservative he is." 9
When Clement left the Justice Department, the legal community
was alight with speculation over where among the power circle of Wash-

7.
Jennifer Bendery, John Boehner Has Collected $742,000for DOMA Defense, Top House
Official
Says,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Mar.
28,
2012,
9:02
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/27/john-boehner-doma-defense n-l 382990.html.
8. Jason Zengerle, The Paul Clement Court,N.Y. MAG., Mar. 26, 2012, at 28, 91.
9.
Kevin Sack, Lawyer Opposing Health Law Is FamiliarFace to the Justices, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 2011, at Al (quoting Walter Dellinger, Solicitor General under President Bill Clinton)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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ington law firms he would settle.' 0 For those who follow the churn of
lateral moves between the Justice Department and the private sector,
Clement's employment was one of the biggest stories in years. One
Washington lawyer described Clement as the "Holy Grail of law firm
recruiting," observing that "the buzz in the legal world about Clement is
like the buzz in basketball when LeBron James was coming out of high
school and turning pro."" Clement settled on King & Spalding, the Atlanta-based powerhouse where he had headed the appellate practice before joining the Justice Department in 2001.12 His decision was viewed
as a significant victory for King & Spalding; the hire would unquestionably raise the firm's profile in Washington, and many believed it would
vault King & Spalding into the upper echelon of the Washington appellate bar, a space occupied by an elite circle of firms specializing in highstakes litigation before the Supreme Court.' 3
By all accounts, Clement exceeded the firm's expectations, bringing
in prominent cases and influential clients and launching the firm into the
spotlight at the Supreme Court. By the time Clement secured the DOMA
contract, he had already assisted the National Football League and the
National Basketball Association in disputes with their respective players'
associations, represented the National Rifle Association before the Supreme Court in a landmark Second Amendment victory, and began work
on behalf of a consortium of state attorneys general in an historic challenge to the Affordable Care Act.14 The DOMA contract, a highly publicized affair and a rare opportunity for a private firm to defend federal
legislation, was just the latest evidence that King & Spalding had struck
gold when it hired Clement.
But no sooner had the terms of the DOMA contract been negotiated
than King & Spalding withdrew its representation. In a statement explaining the decision, firm chairman Robert Hays apologized for the
withdrawal, insisting the "process used for vetting this engagement was
10. See Brett LoGuirato, Why Paul Clement Is the 'Lebron James of Law,' BUS. INSIDER
(Apr. 5, 2012), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2012-04-05/politics/31292022 1_oral-argumentsclement-comparison (there would be a massive bidding war).
11. Peter Page, Legal Life After 'W'for Many Bush Attorneys, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 27, 2008, at
6; see also Natalie Singer, 'Defending Unpopular Positions Is What Lawyers Do': In an Era of
Ideological Fencing, Paul Clement '92 Won't Be Fenced In, HARV. L. BULL. (Winter 2012),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/bulletin/2012/winter/feature 2.php.
12.
Dahlia Lithwick, The Best Offense Is a Good Defense: Why Even Opponents of DOMA
Should Want It to Get a Vigorous Defense, SLATE (Apr. 26, 2011, 5:06 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/2011/04/the-best offense is a good
defense.html.
13.
Tony Mauro, King & Spalding Lands a Big Fish: Paul Clement, BLOG LEGAL TIMES
(Nov. 20, 2008, 12:15 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2008/l l/king-spalding-lands-a-bigfish-paul-clement.html.
14.
Robert Barnes, NRA Avoids Getting Shut Out of Gun Case, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2010, at
Al3; Sack, supra note 9; Tony Mauro, Viet Dinh 's Firm Aims for Appellate Big Leagues with Clement
Hire,
NAT'L
L.
J.
ONLINE
(Apr.
25,
2011),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNU.jsp?id=1202491418249.
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inadequate."15 What prompted the change of course is still disputed.
DOMA supporters tend to believe the firm caved to pressure-not only
from gay equality advocates but also from firm clients and employees. 16
Firm insiders maintain that firm managers did not review the contract
until after it was signed, at which point they concluded the terms were
untenable and asked Clement to unwind it.17
Following the firm's decision, Clement announced he would be
leaving King & Spalding and taking the DOMA contract with him.' 8
Explaining his decision in a widely circulated resignation letter, Clement
said he was resigning "out of the firmly-held belief that a representation
should not be abandoned because the client's legal position is extremely
unpopular in certain quarters." 9 Having accepted the representation,
Clement continued, "I believe there is no honorable course for me but to
complete it."20
Clement, naturally, would land on his feet. He joined Bancroft, an
elite Washington, D.C. boutique founded by Viet Dinh, head of the Office of Legal Counsel under President Bush and a close friend of Clement from Harvard Law School. To the extent a law firm can have an ideological slant, Bancroft tilts decidedly rightward, its staff comprised of a
star-studded collection of former Bush Administration lawyers and Supreme Court clerks. 2 ' Anyone following the Clement saga could sense
Bancroft was a good fit, a place free from the institutional constraints of
a major firm, where he could take on polarizing public interest cases
without fear of upsetting the apple cart (or the business committee that
stocks it). But few could have anticipated just how well Clement would
take to his new environment, nor how swiftly his stock would rise inside
the Washington legal community. 22
When Clement joined Bancroft in April 2011, he brought the
DOMA contract and the healthcare litigation, two of the biggest cases of
the year. Those matters alone would have been a handful for a firm of
15. Ashby Jones, After King & SpaldingDrops DOMA Case, Clement Drops Firm, WALL ST.
J. L. BLoG (Apr. 25, 2011, 12:09 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/25/after-king-spaldingdrops-doma-case-clement-drops-firm/.
16. Greg Sargent, Gay Rights Group: You're Damn Right We PressuredLaw Firm on DOMA,
PLUM LINE (Apr. 26, 2011, 12:13 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/gayrights-group-youre-damn-right-we-pressured-law-firm-on-doma/2011/03/03/AFii9bqE blog.htmi.
17. Jim Galloway & Bill Rankin, King & Spalding to Withdraw from Defending DOMA;
Clement
Resigns,
ATLANTA
J.-CONST.
(Apr.
25,
2011,
10:30
PM),
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local-govt-politics/king-spading-to-withdraw-from-defendingdoma-clem/nQst6/.
18. Letter from Paul Clement to Robert D. Hays, Chairman, King & Spalding LLP (Apr. 25,
2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/04251 I clementresign.pdf.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21.
Galloway & Rankin, supranote 17 (supporting the proposition that Bancroft is known for
advancing conservative causes). The proposition that they hire conservative Supreme Court clerks
and former government attorneys comes from author's personal knowledge.
22. Mauro, supra note 14.
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Bancroft's size, which still had to manage its normal, pre-Clement caseload. But within months Clement would pile on several additional matters destined for the Supreme Court, including two blockbuster federalism cases.
The first case, Perry v. Perez,23 involved a controversial provision
of the Voting Rights Act requiring states with histories of electoral discrimination to preclear new electoral maps with a federal court.24 Texas
had prepared a new map for the 2012 elections but, because of delays in
the preclearance process, had been required to use an interim map drawn
up by a federal judge.2 5 On its face, the case presented a narrow issueCould the court's interim map serve as a proper substitute for the map
proposed by the State, or was the court required to honor the State's policy judgments regarding the size and location of new districts?
Stirring below the surface, however, were weightier questionsMust Southern states with histories of voter discrimination continue to
operate under the watchful eye of the federal courts? Are the widespread
civil rights violations that made federal legislation necessary in 1965
comfortably behind us? Who, between federal courts and state legislatures, should control redistricting under these circumstances? In a symbolic victory for the "states' rights" movement, the Supreme Court sided
with Texas, concluding federal courts must defer to the policy judgments
of state lawmakers when drawing up interim maps.2 6
In the second case, Clement represented Arizona in a politically
charged dispute with the Justice Department over the State's sweeping
new immigration statute. 27 The Justice Department claimed the law interfered with federal immigration policy; Arizona claimed that it was simply trying to help Congress carry that policy out. 28 The question for the
Court was how much latitude states should be allowed in using their own
penalties and procedures to enforce federal immigration laws. 2 9 Next to
healthcare, it was the most important federalism case to reach the Court
in years, and when the Court gutted the law, striking down the majority
of the challenged provisions, it dealt the states' rights movement its most
decisive loss of the term.
More recently, Clement agreed to represent yet another state government in a voting rights dispute with the Justice Department.3 0 In this
case, South Carolina challenged the Justice Department's decision to
23.
132 S. Ct. 934 (2012) (per curiam).
24. Id. at 939.
25. Id. at 940.
26. Id. at 944.
27. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. South Carolina v. United States, No. 12-203 (BMK) (CKK) (JDB), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 146187 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2012).
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block implementation of the State's new voter identification law.3 ' The
Justice Department claims the law, which requires voters to show government-issued identification before casting a ballot, will have the effect
of denying certain residents the right to vote on account of their race.32
Last October, a three-judge district court handed Clement a partial victory. Although the court refused to preclear the photo identification requirement for the November 2012 election, citing concerns that immediate implementation would have an unlawful retrogressive effect on minority voters, it ruled that the provision would not disproportionally burden minority voters in elections beginning in 2013 and beyond.33
Clement had become the bespectacled face of the conservative legal
agenda. He was making the case against the White House on health care,
immigration reform, and gay marriage, but more broadly he was making
the case against unbridled federal power and the Obama Administration's vision of government. "Clement's career is cresting just as the
momentous legal crusades of a radicalized Republican Party are reaching
the appellate level," wrote New York Magazine.34 In a term about the
scope of congressional authority, he had the entire lineup of federalism
cases, two of which-healthcare and Arizona immigration-promised to
leave lasting changes on the balance of power between the states and the
federal government. If it's hard to imagine a private attorney wielding so
much power, it's because there's no modern precedent for it.
Perhaps it was Clement's appeal as a symbol of unity in the midst of
a divisive primary season, or perhaps it was the obvious parallel to the
DOMA saga (just as the White House had walked out on Congress by
refusing to defend DOMA, King & Spalding had walked out on Clement), but Clement's resignation elevated him to new heights of celebrity.
"There's no doubt that Paul has become the leading advocate for the
most deeply conservative causes in the law," said David Frederick, a
prominent Supreme Court lawyer. 35 Clement is a profile in courage, a
lawyer with the backbone to stand for principle in the face of politics.
King & Spalding would become the perfect foil in the Clement narrative,
the firm's perceived cowardice in the face of pressure only magnifying
Clement's courage and resolve. As one conservative writer put, "Where
King and company demonstrated cowardice, Clement showed charac-

31.
Id. at *4.
32. James Rosen & Rebecca Cohen McClatchy, Trial to Look at Voter ID Law, Discrimination
History,
MCCLATCHY,
Aug.
25,
2012,
available
at
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/08/31/164598/sc-voter-id-law-takes-some-hits.html.
33.
See South Carolina v. United States, No. 12-203 (BMK)(CKK)(JDB), 2012 WL 4814094,
at *9-11 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 10, 2012).
34. Zengerle, supra note 8, at 30.
35. Martin Gould, Obamacare Foes Pick Experienced Lawyer for Their Case, NEWSMAX
(Mar.
23,
2012,
4:09
PM),
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/ClementBondihealthcaresupreme/2012/03/23/id/43373 1.
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ter." 36 Glenn Beck called Clement a modem-day hero, equating his resignation with John Adams's decision to represent a British soldier accused of murdering American patriots in Boston. 37 As for King & Spalding, Beck hopes the firm goes out of business.
This tidy narrative obscures a more realistic picture of Clement's
place in the conservative legal landscape. Contrary to most accounts in
the popular press, Clement is not a mouthpiece of the states' rights
movement. He's done a spate of high-profile work for the states, but he
makes his living as a business lawyer representing the interests of large
corporations in cases before state and federal appellate courts. Those
interests coalesce around the common cause of deregulation, or failing
that, less burdensome regulation. We don't read about his business cases
because they concern the private sector and tend to be dryer, low profile,
and devoid of the battleground political issues that animate his other
work.
They also tend to be at odds with his federalism cases. Although
there is nothing inherently inconsistent in fighting for federalism and
deregulation at the same time, in practice the two positions are bound to
clash. Over time the business community's litigation agenda has taken on
a pro-federal bent.39 National businesses prefer the uniformity of federal
law to the conflicts and redundancies of overlapping state regimes. 40 This
is especially true during periods of deregulation, when federal law displaces state law without imposing new burdens of its own, creating the
optimal regulatory environment. But even during periods of heightened
regulation, litigation trends suggest that most businesses would still prefer a standardized set of federal rules to a patchwork of state regulations. 41
Clement's story, then, is more complicated than most observers appreciate. While Clement's public image is bound up with his states'
rights work-Clement has been variously referred to as an "anti-solicitor
general" (New York Magazine),4 2 a right-wing "uber-attomey" (The
36. Doug Carlson, On DOMA: The Courage of Clement, Cowardice of King, ETHICS &
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY COMM'N (May 4, 2011), http://erlc.com/article/on-doma-courage-clementcowardice-king/.
37. Carlos Maza, Beck Lashes Out at King & Spalding, Compares Clement to Civil Rights
Heroes,
-EQUAL.
MATTERS
BLOG
(Apr.
28,
2011,
12:48
PM),
http://equalitymatters.org/blog/201 104280005.
38. Beck Hopes Firm Goes out of Businessfor Failingto Refusing to Defend DOMA, EQUAL.
MATTERS BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011, 8:20 PM), http://equalitymatters.org/emtv/201104270014 (quoting
Glenn Beck Show (Fox News television broadcast Apr. 27, 2011) ("[B]ut Clement's law firm caved
under pressure when things got just a little too uncomfortable, well, I hope they go out of business,
quite frankly.")).
39. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 133 (2004).
40. SOLVEIG STEVENSON, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., RETHINKING FEDERALISM: THE CASE
FOR PREEMPTION INTHE INFORMATION AGE 1 (2011).
41.
See infra Part Ill.
42. Zengerle, supra note 8, at 30.
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43
Guardian),
a conservative "ideological warrior" (Daily Beast)," and
the "go-to guy for controversial conservative causes" (Above the
Law)4 5-he continues to make his living as a commercial litigator, helping the business community pursue a pro-federal legal agenda. Both roles
are "conservative" in the sense that they further objectives commonly
associated with the political right, but one requires him to champion federalism while the other requires him to rein it in. From a legal standpoint,
there is nothing wrong with challenging federal power on Wednesday
then turning around and promoting it on Thursday; a lawyer's pursuits
are governed by the interests of the client, not ideological purity.

But what about from an ideological standpoint? Remove Clement
from the picture and examine the two principles in the abstract-Is the
push for federalism at odds with the push for deregulation? Can legal
conservatism embrace both tenets and still claim to represent a coherent
body of principles? If not, which tenet lies closer to the heart of modernday conservative thought?
These questions need answers before there can be a serious discussion about the future of legal conservatism. As Professor Ernest Young
has observed, "[C]onfusion about ideological labels has seriously distorted the debate about constitutional interpretation generally." 46 The confusion begins with our language. We speak of legal conservatism as if it
were a uniform and ordered whole when in fact it is messier, less organized, and more fragmented. Legal conservatism is not a monolith but
rather a collection of principles and doctrines cobbled together under a
shared label.
Our understanding of "conservatism" is pliable enough to bend with
context. According to Professor Young, "virtually all participants in the
debate have defined conservatism operationally, as whatever jurisprudence is advocated by judges, academics, and politicians generally considered to be on the rightward end of the political spectrum." 47 We saw
the term manipulated in the wake of the healthcare decision, when opponents of the Affordable Care Act criticized Chief Justice Roberts for failing to reach the "conservative" outcome 48 at the same time that support43. Matt Seaton (MattSeaton) on Twitter, TWITTER (Mar. 12, 2012, 8:49 AM),
http://twitter.com/mattseaton/status/185393313719918593.
44. Chris Geidner, Paul Clement Argues Both Sides of the Federalism Debate, DAILY BEAST
(Apr. 26, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articies/2012/04/26/paul-clement-arguesboth-sides-of-the-federalism-debate.html.
45. Staci Zaretsky, Lawyer of the Month: March ReaderPoll, ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 5, 2012,
2:37 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/04/lawyer-of-the-month-march-reader-poll/.
46.
Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism:Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional
Interpretation,72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 623 (1994).
47.
Id. at 621.
48.
Luke Johnson, John Roberts Outrages Conservatives in Health Care Ruling, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 28, 2012, 1:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/28/john-robertsconservatives-health-care-rulingnl 634512.html.
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ers applauded his restrained and "conservative" approach to judicial review.4 9 One side was using "conservative" to refer to a substantive political outcome, the other to a legal philosophy, but both had laid legitimate
claim to the term.
We fall into similar semantic traps when we talk about Paul Clement. Clement can advance a "conservative" cause by helping states push
back against expansive interpretations of national power. But he can also
advance a "conservative" cause by representing cost-weary businesses
seeking to replace patchy state regulations with uniform federal laws.
Determining which cause is closer to the heartland of conservative
thought ought to be a priority for legal conservatives, if not for their benefit then for the common good, because nobody is well served when
pundits and politicians speak of "conservative" laws or "conservative"
rulings or "conservative" judges without having the cloudiest idea which
principles the term embraces.
II. THE TENSION BETWEEN FEDERALISM AND DEREGULATION

In his memoir about his years as Solicitor General under President
Ronald Reagan, Charles Fried says the most frustrating aspect of his job
was catering to ideologues inside the Administration who would cry foul
anytime the Justice Department took a position in tension with the Administration's stance on federalism.o The Reagan Administration was
resolved to rein in the federal bureaucracy and redress the yawning disparity in power between the state and federal government. "The driving
force behind [its] argument was the belief, widely held in the generation
that had framed and ratified the Constitution, that strong local institutions
were a bulwark of democracy and a protection against impositions by an
arrogant, distant, and overreaching national government." 5' For the "federalism police," as Fried dubbed them, the Administration's vision of
state autonomy was an article of faith, a project to be elevated above
most other domestic policy goals.52 Pressing ideas inconsistent with this
orthodoxy, even when they stemmed from equally settled conservative
tenets like deregulation, "seemed like defiance of the Holy Office."
Fried thought the Administration's dogmatic approach to federalism
shortsighted. He left the Harvard Law School faculty to join the Reagan
Administration because he believed in one of its central missions: relieving American business of the burden of excessive regulation. He ques49. Harvard Law Prof: Roberts' Ruling Was Conservative, CBS NEWS (June 29, 2012, 8:25
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505263_162-57463529/harvard-law-prof.-roberts-ruling-wasconservative/.
50.
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND
ACCOUNT 182 (1991).

51.
52.
53.

Id. at 186.
Id. at 188.
Id at 52.
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tioned whether deregulation could be achieved in conjunction with the
Administration's promise to restore greater regulatory power to the
states. He feared that devolving regulatory authority to states would lead
to more regulation and less economic liberty, outcomes inimical to the
Administration's pro-business agenda.5 4 His distrust of local government
stemmed in part from his years in Cambridge (he calls it the "The People's Republic of Cambridge"), a city notorious for its draconian approach to rent control." In Cambridge, as in his birth country of Czechoslovakia, Fried witnessed local government at its most stifling. He came
to Washington intent on defending capitalism wherever it might be
threatened, convinced economic freedom was no more secure from provincial government bodies than national ones. "[T]he same social forces
that had produced overregulation in federal programs were hard at work
at the state level and could sometimes only be resisted by uniform federal
standards," Fried wrote. 56
Although Fried's skepticism was weakening his influence inside the
Administration, he continued to voice it. When the Justice Department
was told to advocate for a legal presumption favoring local regulations to
the extent they conflict with federal law, Fried resisted. "This seemed to
me a disastrous idea," he wrote.57 "Better that firms operating on a national basis be subject to one uniform system of regulation than to scores
of different ones. In a fractured and uncoordinated situation, businesses
would as a practical matter be forced to comply with whatever regulations were most stringent."
Fried was speaking from personal experience, but he might as well
have been describing the last several decades of conservative legal
thought. Conservatives had been wrestling with the competing tenets of
federalism and deregulation well before Fried joined the Reagan Administration. According to Walter Dellinger, a Solicitor General under President Clinton, the tension between deregulation and federalism is a matter
of "timeless debate." 59 "There is a genuine fissure," he says, "between
the twin poles of states' rights on the one hand and freedom from excessive and multiplicitous and often inconsistent regulations on the other."60
When we speak of states' rights, it is often with the curious assumption that devolving regulatory authority to state governments will make
for less regulation. 6 1 There is a perception that the states' right move54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
4 N.Y.U.
60.
61.

See id
Id. at 186-87.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 187.
Id.
The Roberts Court and Federalism: Minutes from a Convention ofthe Federalist Society,
J. L. & LIBERTY 330, 333 (2009) [hereinafter Roberts Court and Federalism].
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ment, being a project of the right wing, is synonymous with free markets
and deregulation. For Dellinger, states' rights had always called to mind
classic conservative imagery like "George Corley Wallace standing in
the schoolhouse door." 6 2 But whereas proponents of states' rights would
undoubtedly prefer their project work in harmony with conservative tenets like deregulation and economic liberty, the more sensible among
them have come to understand it does not always work out that way.
Today, Dellinger says, "states' rights look more appealing to people who
want to urge more liabilities on corporations, more recovery, more punitive attitudes, more regulatory protections."
Emboldened by years of deregulation under President Reagan, liberal interest groups redoubled lobbying efforts in state legislatures. Many
had success-the environmentalists in California, New York, and Massachusetts; the labor unions in California and Michigan; the anti-tobacco
groups in New England; and the bank reformers in New York. But perhaps no group antagonized the business community with as much success as the trial lawyers. In cooperation with consumer protection
groups, the trial bar has gradually tilted the scale in civil litigation by
pushing laws that make it easier to sue and collect damages from corpo66
rations.66 Year after year, state by state, it has succeeded, securing longer
limitations periods, restrictions on arbitration clauses, expanded tort liability for employers and manufacturers, as well as countless reforms designed to make civil litigation a vexing and costly enterprise for corporations.67 Meanwhile, state courts fashioned creative remedies permitting
plaintiffs to recover damages from multiple corporate defendants based
on their respective shares of the market, and state attorneys general have
ramped up litigation against corporate defendants in areas of national
interest like firearms, lead paint, mortgage practices, and greenhouse
68
gasses.
The business climate is especially uninviting in states where the trial bar acts at the behest of the government. In these states, the attorney
general plays the role of general contractor, auctioning off potential tort

62. Id
63.
Id. at 334.
64.
See Young, supra note 39, at 133-34.
65.
Richard P. leyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco
Litigation,and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1859 (2000).
66. See, e.g., Tim Murphy, Rick Perry v. The Trial Lawyers, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 22, 2011,
6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2011/08/rick-perry-vs-trial-lawyers; Lamar Smith,
Trial
Bar
v.
Tort
Reform,
POLITICO
(Oct.
1,
2009,
8:25
AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0909/27761.html; Marilyn Tennissen, Business, Trial Bar at
Odds over Pending Texas Asbestos Bills, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Apr. 6, 2009, 2:29 PM),
http://legalnewsline.comlasbestos/220228-business-trial-bar-at-odds-over-pending-texas-asbestosbills.
67. See Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratoriesof Democracy, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1501, 1511-12 (2009).

68.

Id. at 1503.
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judgments to plaintiff firms eager to assume regulatory power.69 The
practice, known in the scholarly community as "regulation through litigation," gained national attention in the 1990s when plaintiff lawyers made
a mint suing tobacco companies and gun manufacturers on behalf of state
governments, 70 and was further popularized by Eliot Spitzer during his
tenure as attorney general of New York.
Spitzer is not whom the Reagan revolutionaries envisioned when
they set out to restore a balance of power between state and federal authority. Yet he was, in a peculiar way, precisely what they bargained for.
Spitzer embodied a modem and muscular vision of state sovereignty.
Before figures like Spitzer emerged, state attorneys general were viewed
as watchdogs for consumers, their mandate limited to tracking down
unscrupulous landlords and corrupt nursing homes. 7 1 But Spitzer envisioned an entirely different role for his office, combining his investigative authority with an ambitious interpretation of New York's jurisdiction to insert the state into areas traditionally reserved for federal enforcement. His project culminated in the late 2000s with a string of enforcement actions against Wall Street financial institutions. Spitzer went
after the banks, the mutual funds, the insurers, and reinsurers.72 He even
went after the record companies, accusing some of the world's largest
labels of withholding millions of dollars in royalties. 73 Most of his targets
would pay extravagant fines and accede to severe restrictions on their
business practices.74
But for all of his anti-business crusading, it may have been Spitzer's
coziness with the trial bar that permanently estranged him from the business community. To maximize the threat of liability, Spitzer deputized
plaintiff lawyers and invited them to carry out his oversight role through
contingency-fee suits. 7 5 These suits, which allowed private lawyers to
wield the power and prestige of the State, had a way of bringing companies to the settlement table, and dozens of corporate defendants were
forced to change their business practices or pay significant settlements as
a result.76 What sets regulation through litigation apart from the tradi69. Joseph Forderer, State Sponsored Global Warming Litigation: Federalism Properly
Utilized or Abused?, 18 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 25 n.7 (2010).
70.
Edward T. Schroeder, A Tort by Any Other Name? In Search of the Distinction Between
Regulation Through Litigationand Conventional Tort Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 897, 900-01 (2005).
71.
William B. Eimicke & Daniel Shacknai, Eliot Spitzer: "The People's Lawyer"Disgraced,10 PUB. INTEGRYry 365, 367 (2008).
72. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, SEC, Spitzer Sue Mutual FundFirm; Columbia Is Accused of
Hurting Investors, WASH. PosT, Feb. 25, 2004, at E4 (describing suits against mutual fund firms);
Floyd Norris, When Spitzer Speaks, Insurers Take Note, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at Cl (describing Spitzer's investigation of insurance companies).
73.
Lola Ogunnaike, Record Labels Must Pay ShortchangedPerformers, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
2004, at El.
74. Andrew P. Morriss et al., ChoosingHow to Regulate, 29 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 182
(2005).
75.
See id. at 203 n.117.
76. Id. at 181-82.
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tional tort suit is the plaintiffs motivation: regulatory lawsuits are motivated by a desire to change the behavior of the defendant, rather than by
a desire to collect money damages.
Pro-business conservatives take particular offense to the practice
because it combines two of their least favorite things-government regulation and the class action lawsuit. It is, critics say, an abuse of government power and a circumvention of the democratic process because unlike private litigants, government "super plaintiffs" can protect themselves from the injurious conduct through regulation or taxes. 7 7 "These
discretionary decisions of state attorneys general regarding which manufacturing industries to target represent a critical aspect of product regulation in today's economy and a major shift in the allocation of powers
among the coordinate branches of government."78 Or, as Senator Mitch
McConnell put it, "The more fundamental problem with 'regulation
through litigation' is that private parties obtain through lawsuits what
legislatures have not chosen, or have even chosen to reject."79
It's not only the cost of litigation that dogs the business community,
it's the uncertainty and second-guessing that poisons decision making.80
Tort liability is most burdensome in states where the standards of care
are set by state court judges and juries rather than by legislatures. In
those states, manufacturers have less guidance in developing safety
measures, and because juries don't undertake the cost-benefit analysis
that lawmakers do, liability standards tend to be skewed in favor of consumers.8 ' Meanwhile, the interests of the countless consumers who actually benefit from the product, be it a prescription drug or a safety belt or
a lawnmower, are not represented in court.
Your position on tort reform, then, is a strong indicator of where
you fit inside the conservative legal movement. Tort reform is a fixture
on the GOP platform, and Republican lawmakers who rely on corporate
donors neglect it at their own peril. But if you are serious about states'
rights, you must be willing to accept the consequences of state regulation, and one of the most controversial consequences of state regulation
is more litigation. That's why tort reform tests the nerves of states' rights
conservatives: it requires sharing common ground with natural enemies
like trial lawyers.
Early last year, House Republicans proposed capping the damages
awardable by state court judges in medical malpractice and personal inju77. Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and Parens
Patriae ProductLitigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913, 938 (2008).
78. Id. at 938-39.
79. Paul Weyrich, Willpower: Losing Weight the Responsible Way, NAT'L CTR. FOR PUB.
POL'Y RES. LEGAL BRIEFS (Apr. 16, 2004), http://www.nationalcenter.org/LB4 1.html.
80. Klass, supra note 67.
Seeid atl5lln.31.
81.

2013]

THE STATE OF CONSERVATIVE LEGAL THOUGHT

605

ry cases. 82 The law received a warm reception from the business lobby,
which has for years been calling on Congress to reform the civil justice
system and reign in the trial lawyers; and a predictably fiery one from
House Democrats, who criticized Republicans for weakening accountability in the provision of healthcare and giving negligent doctors a free
pass.8' The real story was opposition from certain corners of the Republican Party. 84 Virginia Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli, a leader in the
push to overturn the Affordable Care Act, said the bill was "breathtakingly broad in its assumptions about federal power."85 He pointed to the
proposed law as evidence of a "constitutional disconnect" among Republicans who oppose federal power when it's used for ill (he gives the example of Obamacare) yet still feel comfortable telling state court judges
how to conduct civil trials. 86 Congressman Louie Gohmert, a Texas Republican, said he was "reticent to support Congress imposing its will on
the states by dictating new state law in their own state courts." 8 Echoing
these concerns, Senator Tom Coburn wondered where the line would be
drawn once Congress put its "nose under the tent to start telling [states]
what their tort law will be."
Randy Barnett, the prolific right-wing legal scholar and one of the
most vocal opponents of the Affordable Care Act, was more direct.
"What constitutional authority did the supporters of the bill rely upon to
justify interfering with state authority in this way?"89 Barnett asked, before accusing the bill's proponents of practicing "fair-weather federalism," which is to say, supporting federalism only to the extent that it is
consistent with other policy objectives. 90 In Barnett's circle, this is a polite way of calling someone spineless.
Barnett didn't coin "fair-weather federalism." The pejorative has
been in use for decades, reserved for "hypocritical" conservatives who
speak fondly of state rights' one day and then turn around and undermine
82. See Todd Ruger, House GOP Pushing Tort Reform Bill that Democrats Say Will Fail in
Senate,
BLOG
LEGAL
TIMES
(Apr.
19,
2012,
1:02
PM),
http://legaltimes.typepad.cofmf/blt2012/04/house-gop-pushing-tort-reform-bill-that-democrats-saywill-fail-in-senate.html.
83.
See id.
84. Julian Pecquet, State Lawmakers Blast House GOP's Medical Malpractice Reform Bill,
THE HILL (Mar. 14, 2012, 4:04 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/state-issues/216099-statelawmakers-blast-medical-malpractice-reform-bill-.
85.
Ken Cuccinelli, Op-Ed., Keeping the Feds at Bay, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/keeping-the-feds-atbay/2011/10/28/glQAFJfUQM story.html.
86. Id.
87. David Nather, Tort Reform Bill Hits Speed Bump, POLITICO (Feb. 9, 2011, 6:45 PM),
http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=BBCOOAF8-35CA-46D7-8DCD-AA3DOEDIECO5
(internal quotation mark omitted).
88. Eli Y. Adashi, The Sustainale Growth Rate-What Happens Now?, MEDSCAPE NEWS
(June 30, 2011), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/745412.
89. Randy E. Barnett, Tort Reform and the GOP's Fair-Weather Federalism, WASH.
EXAMINER (May 21, 2011, 12:54 AM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/39943.
90. Id.
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them the next. They called President Bush a fair-weather federalist when
he supported a federal cloning ban, ' and they said the same thing about
Governor Rick Perry, who has suggested Texas might be better off a
secessionist state, when he said he would back a federal constitutional
amendment defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman.92
Barnett's criticism would have had more resonance in the 1980s,
when legal conservatives were all camping under one tent. Back then
everybody shared the same priority-undoing the damage wrought by
the Warren Court and two decades of judicial overreaching. The movement was still in a reactive posture, united under the banner of judicial
restraint, its common interest in reforming the courts masking longburied ideological differences.
Although a shared distaste for the Warren Court can kindle a
movement, it cannot sustain it-at least not from an organizational
standpoint. A legal movement needs a support structure before it can
produce consistent results in the courts. But notwithstanding a surge in
membership and popular support, legal conservatism remained weak and
disorganized, a movement without sway in the legal academy or a viable
agenda in the courts. 93 So while the conditions had been ripe for a conservative revolution in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Nixon appointed
four Justices to the Supreme Court between 1969 and 1974), the movement still had no legs to stand on, no way to turn anger and frustration
into concerted action.
In his book about the rise of the conservative legal movement, Stephen Teles chronicles the movement's transformation from a fringe and
widely discredited ideology to a mainstream school of thought. 9 4 Beginning in the 1970s, when conservatives began populating law school faculties, the outlines of the modern movement started to take shape. 9 5 Consistent with grooming processes long familiar to the left, right-leaning
graduates from top law schools were encouraged to begin their careers in
prestigious clerkships with conservative judges and justices. 6 The idea
was to "replicate the function that major universities serve on the left of
creating a community of people with similar views on similar issues."97
These clerkships, in turn, opened doors to faculty appointments and government placements previously dominated by left-leaning lawyers.
Around the same time, a group of young academics founded the Federal91.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Fair-Weather Federalism?, Fox NEWS (Apr. 22, 2002),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,50840,00.htmi.
92.
Mike Riggs, Rick Perry's Fair-Weather Federalism, REASON.COM (July 29, 2011),
http://reason.com/archives/2011/07/29/rick-perrys-tenuous-understand.
93.
STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE
FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 2 (2008).
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ist Society with the aim of building a conservative "counter-elite" to
challenge the dominance of the liberal orthodoxy in the nation's top law
schools and legal institutions. These were positive developments, and
the Federalist Society would eventually prove instrumental to the movement's development, but it was not until conservatives began channeling
resources into long-term litigation campaigns that the movement started
reaping dividends in the courts.
Following the lead of established public-interest groups like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the
American Civil Liberties Union, conservatives leveraged their newfound
foothold in the legal academy by recruiting young lawyers into publicinterest law firms (PILFs) where they could further the movement's litigation agenda. 99 Their progress was slow going. According to Teles, the
"first-generation PLLFs" struggled to build strong reputations because
they were too closely linked to local business interests, their main source
of funding.' 00 Intimate ties to the business lobby frustrated their efforts to
develop a public-interest identity, and it took the emergence of a second
generation of PELFs, this one funded not by local chambers of commerce
but by individual donors and other public-interest groups, to set the
0 As Mark Tushnet put it, "[T]he first
states' rights agenda on track.o'
generation of conservative public interest law firms was unable to pull
off the public-relations move of identifying the interests of large businesses with the public interest."' 0 2
The second wave of PILFs went some way toward addressing the
organizational problem, lending the movement more authenticity and
garnering a strong base of ideological support.103 Public-interest groups
prefer ideological donors because they do not demand instant gratification and won't limit funding to projects promising quick payoffs. ' Rather, they tend to appreciate the grinding pace at which movements are
built and equipped to compete with the well-endowed institutions on the
other side of the aisle.
But while the P1LFs overcame their organizational problems, they
made only modest headway in the courts. The movement appeared to
gain traction in the 1990s when the Supreme Court issued a series of
decisions scaling back the broad interpretation of federal power that had
prevailed in the Court since the New Deal era. It was during this period
98. Id. at 138.
99. Id. at 67.
100. Id. at 221.
101.
Id. at 68-69 ("The firms' business-heavy caseload lent credence to their adversaries'
argument that, far from being defenders of the public interest, they were nothing more than shill for
conservative business interests.").
102. Mark Tushnet, What Consequences Do Ideas Have?, 87 TEX L. REV. 447, 453-54 (2008)
(reviewing TELES, supra note 93).
TELES, supra note 93, at 221.
103.
104. Id. at 222.
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that the Supreme Court, for the first time in six decades, invalidated a
federal law on the ground that it exceeded congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause.'05 Although the Supreme Court had not struck
down a federal law since 1937, it would strike down thirty-three over the
next eight years,' 06 a trend that led experts to predict the Court would
adopt a pre-New Deal approach to the commerce power.
But the trend would be short-lived. Although judicial conservatism
remained ascendant throughout the period, over time it stopped paying
dividends for the states' rights movement. In 2005, the Supreme Court
ruled that Congress could, consistent with its authority under the Commerce Clause, proscribe the production and use of homegrown marijuana, even though the marijuana was permitted under state law and intended for personal consumption.' 07 The Court based the decision, Gonzales
v. Raich, on an expansive interpretation of the commerce power,'os dashing hopes that it would restore the pre-New Deal vision of limited federal
power.
Scholars disagree about the point at which the Court took a nationalist turn, with some contending it was the late 1990s, others suggesting
it was the early years of the Roberts Court, and still others convinced it's
been a pro-federal court all along. But everyone agrees the Court's decision in Raich was a death knell of sorts for the states' rights movement.109 In retrospect, the Court's flirtation with states' rights in the
1990s has been attributed not to the movement but rather to the presence
on the Supreme Court of ideological allies like Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor. "The two Justices who believed most strongly in federalism
have both left the Court," wrote David Strauss, a professor at the University of Chicago, in a piece about the waning influence of judicial conservatism.1o

The Supreme Court would continue to uphold expansive interpretations of federal power well into the 2000s, but the Court's nationalist,
pro-business agenda would find its stride in the Roberts Court."' The
Roberts Court is rightfully viewed as a business-friendly court, but its
2
pro-business orientation owes much to its bold vision of federal power."
105. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
106. Christopher R. Drahozal, Preserving the American Common Market: State and Local
Governments in the United States Supreme Court, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 233, 280-83 app.A
(1999).
107. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
108. See id.at 22.
109. See Mark C. Christie, Economic Regulation in the United States: The Constitutional
Framework, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 949, 977 (2006).
110. David A. Strauss, The Death of Judicial Conservatism, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1, 10 (2009).
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See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court, Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38, 38.
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Assessment, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 943, 950 (2009).
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Since Chief Justice Roberts took the helm in 2005, the Court has been
preoccupied with preemption. The issue has been a fixture on the Roberts
Court docket since the beginning, and the Court's decisions tend to favor
federal law and the particular corporate stakeholder invoking it."1 3
[A]t the same time the Court was cutting back on Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause in the name of states' rights, it began
to limit significantly the ability of states to provide tort rights and
remedies for its citizens by preempting common law and statutory
claims for damages associated with drugs, medical devices, and consumer products .... 114
Each statutory scheme is different, of course, and the Court's approach toward preemption will vary from case to case. Still, the general
trend favors uniformity over multiplicity, federal over state. More specifically, it reflects the Court's suspicion of tort litigation as a means of
regulating commercial conduct.115 The Roberts Court is happy to uphold
federal power if it means not subjecting businesses to the whims ofjuries
or state trial judges.
Conservatives devoted to promoting deregulation are finding it increasingly difficult to share common ground with the states' rights
movement. Their differences sharpened during the financial crisis, when
the business community supported some of the Obama Administration's
more dramatic federal interventions into the economy. While the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce (the Chamber) went on record in support of the
stimulus package and the Troubled Asset Relief Program, states' rights
groups accused the federal government of overreaching and challenged
the program in court.l 16 Since parting ways in the late 1970s, the two
camps have found independent sources of funding, occupied separate
spheres of power, and advanced diverging positions on some of the biggest cases of the day. Although still loosely linked together under the
conservative banner, the camps have little left in common, and often find
themselves on opposing sides of the same case. Remarking on this trend,
Professor Young said, "It is no longer possible to equate a vote for state
autonomy with a vote for a politically conservative result."' 1 7

113. See, e.g., Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1265-66 (2012) (holding
that state law tort claims of defective design and failure to warn were preempted by the Locomotive
Inspection Act); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1075-76 (2011) (holding that National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act preempts all design-defect claims against vaccine manufacturers
brought by plaintiffs who seek compensation for injury or death caused by vaccine side effects).
114.
Klass, supranote 67, at 1504-05.
115. See id.
116.
Seth Bailey, TARP Challenged in Federal Court, OPENMARKET.ORG (Feb. 9, 2009),
http://www.openmarket.org/2009/02/09/tarp-challenged-in-federal-court/.
Ernest Young, The Conservative Case for Federalism, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 874, 875
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Organizationally, the business community is the strongest camp in
the conservative legal establishment, its advantage so considerable that at
least one scholar describes it as being outside the establishment entirely.
"[W]e may have seen a return of business-oriented conservative litigation, but it is now outside the conservative legal movement's institutional
framework," Professor Mark Tushnet observed."' The business community owes part of its institutional strength to the Chamber, the world's
largest business federation, whose membership comprises more than
300,000 companies." 9 The Chamber spends a mind-blowing amount of
money-more than the national committees of both major parties combined-to advance its agenda in Washington, and its litigation wing, the
National Chamber Litigation Center, has had unparalleled success before
the Supreme Court, both in its capacity as a party and as amicus writing
in support of the business community.120
Viewed against this backdrop, the 2011-2012 Supreme Court docket offers a skewed picture of the state of modern conservatism. While the
Supreme Court has shown a renewed interest in federalism cases, it's
seldom that their outcomes favor the states' rights movement. "[O]ne
thing you cannot say," lamented Professor David Strauss, in addressing
the Court's pro-federal trend, "is that this is a Court that cares deeply
about local prerogatives and protecting local governments from the intrusions of people in Washington, D.C."'21
III. PREEMPTION AND THE FATE OF THE STATES' RIGHTS MOVEMENT

In November 2008, the Federalist Society hosted a seminar on the
Roberts Court and its commitment to federalism.12 2 Paul Clement was
there, flanked by an impressive panel of law professors and lawyers,
including Walter Dellinger, former Solicitor General under President
Clinton. Dellinger opened the discussion on a confrontational note, calling attention to a rift in conservative legal thought between deregulation
and states' rights.123 Dellinger was a Democrat addressing a room full of
Republicans, and he undoubtedly recognized that he was treading on
precarious ground with this topic. But he forged on, insisting conserva-

118. Tushnet, supra note 102, at 456.
119. About the Chamber of Commerce, USCHAMBER.COM, http://www.uschamber.com/about
(last visited Feb. 22, 2013). But see Josh Harkinson, US Chamber Shrinks Membership 90%,
MOTHER JONES (Oct. 14, 2009, 9:33 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2009/10/us-chambercaves-membership-numbers.
120. Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court: Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, at Al; Eric Lipton et al., Large Donations Aid U.S. Chamber in Election
Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, at Al; see also David L. Franklin, What Kind of BusinessFriendly Court? Explaining the Chamber of Commerce's Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1019, 1019 (2009).
121.
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122. See Roberts Court and Federalism, supra note 59, at 330.
123. See id.at 333.
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tives were due for a reckoning: they would eventually have to decide
which tenet embodies core conservatism.12 4
Clement spoke later. He had prepared remarks about federalism and
the Roberts Court, but he was not about to let Dellinger's comments
slide. Clement rejected the idea that the two schools of thought are inherently contradictory.12 5 The question, he said, was not how much regulation is acceptable but rather who should be doing the regulating.126
Clement believes you can defend a limited role for the federal government and still accept uniform federal authority in areas where states cannot act collectively.12 7 By the same token, he said, you can favor deregulation and still recognize room for state action in areas where state laws
won't create tension.128
Clement's remarks echo a position he took a decade earlier in a
short essay about preemption he co-authored with Viet Dinh, now his
colleague at Bancroft.12 9 The authors criticized commentators for mistaking the Court's preemption cases for cases about federalism. 3 0 In their
view, federalism cases present big-pictre scholarly questionsquestions about the boundaries of federal and state authority, about
which sovereign can act and when.131 Preemption cases tend to be narrower, their outcomes turning on the scope of a statute or the intent of
Congress, the cases often decided without regard for constitutional principles.13 2 "There is no real tension between the Supreme Court's federalism decisions and its preemption cases because the latter, properly understood, are not 'about federalism."" 33
Clement's explanation has logical appeal, but is there any evidence
that it works that way in practice? In other words, does the states' rights
agenda operate in tension with that of the business community? Is the
business community considering where its agenda fits with legal conservatism generally and federalism specifically, and if so, will it pull
back where its success threatens to undermine the ongoing campaign for
states' rights?
Clement knows better than anyone that the two sides are pushing
the courts in different directions, their most common point of contention
being preemption, or the extent to which federal law displaces state law
124.
See id at 336.
125.
Id. at 352-53.
126. Id. at 360-61.
127. See id. at 353.
128. See id at 360.
129. Paul D. Clement & Viet D. Dinh, When Uncle Sam Steps In: There's No Real Disharmony
Between High Court Decisions Backing Preemption and the Federalism Push of Recent Years,
LEGAL TIMES, June 19, 2000, at 66, 66.
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133. Id. at 66 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991)).
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in a particular policy area. Having argued both sides of the preemption
debate, Clement knows the business community has come to value the
doctrine with the same fervor that the states' rights movement has come
to detest it. By the same token, he knows the success of one side often
comes at the expense of the other. A Supreme Court decision upholding
the supremacy of federal law not only threatens to displace state action in
the affected policy area but also strengthens the preemption doctrine by
making it more likely that federal law will displace state action in other
areas.
Clement knows this because he helped the business community secure some of the signature preemption victories of the last decade. He
regularly appears on behalf of the business lobby in the Court's preemption cases, often with the aim of obtaining precedents at odds with the
states' rights agenda. In Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 34
a case about the preemptive scope of federal seatbelt regulations, he filed
an amicus brief on behalf of a group of auto manufacturers. 135 He argued
that a state court judgment imposing liability on Mazda for failing to
incorporate lap-shoulder seatbelts in certain seating positions was
preempted by federal regulations allowing manufacturers to install laponly belts in the same positions.136 His argument ultimately failed, and
it's a good thing for the states' rights crowd, because implicit in the
claim was the legally fraught proposition that states may not mandate
what Congress left optional.
Clement would have better luck in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC,'37 a
highly anticipated preemption case about vaccine safety.' 38 The issue
there was whether federal law could shield vaccine manufacturers from
tort suits arising from vaccine-related injuries. Clement, writing on behalf of the vaccine industry, argued that subjecting vaccine manufacturers to state law liability for design defects would upset the federal regulatory regime.' 39 That regime had been carefully calibrated to hold manufacturers accountable to plaintiffs injured by defective vaccines, while
still limiting manufacturers' exposure to frivolous lawsuits. Introducing
state tort liability, manufacturers argued, would upset this delicate balance.140 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the vaccine manufacturers,

134.
131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011).
135. See Brief of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011) (No. 08-1314),
2010 WL 3820816.
136. Id. at 21.
137.
131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011).
138. Id. at 1072.
139. See Brief of Glaxosmithkline L.L.C. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
6, Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (No. 09-152).
140. Id.
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cementing another victory for the business community in its push for
control of the Court's preemption doctrine.141
In Kurns v. RailroadFriction Products Corp.,14 2 Clement filed an
amicus brief on behalf of General Electric (GE), the world's leading
manufacturer of diesel-electric locomotives. He argued that the Locomotive Inspection Act broadly preempts the field of locomotive safety,
crowding out state laws aimed at regulating the design and construction
of locomotives.143 He asked the Court to hold that federal locomotive
regulations preempted a state law tort claim against a distributor of locomotive parts that contained asbestos.'" GE's position on preemption
was aggressive-even more so than that of the Justice Department,
which allowed for the possibility that states could permissibly regulate
non-operational locomotives. The Supreme Court sided with GE and the
parts distributor, concluding the Locomotive Act leaves no room for state
action in the field of locomotive safety.145
Clement also had a hand in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,146
one of the more undervalued preemption victories of the decade.147 The
suit began as a class action brought by AT&T customers who had been
charged sales tax for the retail price of phones they received for free.14 8
When AT&T invoked a provision in the sales contract disallowing class
action suits, the plaintiffs cried foul, claiming the class action is the only
cost-effective way to pursue small-dollar claims against large corporations like AT&T. It would be unconscionable, they argued, to let consumers sign away their rights to their only realistic remedy.' 4 9 The question before the Court was whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
preempts state laws that prohibit contracts with class action waivers. so
The Court said yes-at least to the extent such rules interfere with the
objective of the federal statute that the Court identified as promoting the
expeditious and informal resolution of consumer claims.' 5 ' The Court
takes a dim view of state laws that restrict the formation of arbitration
agreements, especially when they have the effect of requiring the availability of remedies like the class action suit, which "interfere[] with fun-
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Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1082.
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132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012).
143.
Brief for General Electric Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7-8, Kurns
v. R.R. Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012) (No. 10-879), 2011 WL 4872044, at *7-8.
144.
Id. at 8.
145.
Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1270.
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
146.
Clement was retained by the wireless industry lobby to write an amicus brief in support of
147.
AT&T's position on preemption. See Brief of CTIA-The Wireless Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3183858.
148. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
149.
See id. at 1745.
150.
Id. at 1744.
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See id. at 1748.
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damental attributes of arbitration and thus create[] a scheme inconsistent
with [federal law]." 52
After Concepcion, corporations can use collective action waivers to
shield themselves from high-volume, small-dollar suits then rest comfortably knowing consumers will seldom pursue claims individually. As
Justice Breyer observed in his dissent, "The realistic alternative to a class
action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only
a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30." 153 Critics fear the effects of the decision will spill into other areas like labor law where class action waivers
promise to considerably limit exposure to civil liability.' 54 Already, lawyers are advising employers to insert class action waivers in their employment contracts.155
All of the doctrinal developments of recent years circumscribing the

reach of class actions pale in import next to the game-changing edict
that companies with possible exceptions that warrant close scrutiny
may simply opt out of potential liability by incorporating class action
waiver language in their standard-form contracts with consumers (or
employees or others). s6

Taken together, Clement's preemption cases tell the story of a lawyer who spends as much time challenging states' rights as he does promoting them. Clement's victories for the business community have not
occurred in a vacuum: today's preemption victories lay the groundwork
for tomorrow's, strengthening the business lobby's litigation agenda by
reinforcing the doctrinal case for uniform federal law. The Court's decision in Bruesewitz will stand in the way of state legislatures seeking to
regulate vaccine manufacturers and similar industries subject to close
federal supervision, while its decision in Kurns makes state law a nonfactor in the area of railroad safety. Kurns is especially notable because it
would later be cited by the Justice Department as support for its preemption position in the Arizona immigration case,157 forcing Clement, Arizona's lawyer, to argue against a pro-preemption decision he helped secure.
But neither decision rivals Concepcion in its potential to alter the
balance of power between the federal government and the states. Before
152. Id
153. Id at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d
656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Nantiya Ruan, What's Left to Remedy Wage Theft?: How Arbitration Mandates that Bar
Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. passim (forthcoming).
155. See, e.g., Lisa M. Carvalho, US. Supreme CourtReverses Ninth Circuit: FederalArbitration Act Preempts CaliforniaLaw to Uphold Waiver of Class Action Option in Mandatory Arbitration, EMP'T L. WATCH (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.employmentlawwatch.com/tags/att-mobility-vconcepcion/.
156. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012).
157. See Brief for the United States at 27, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)
(No. I1-182), 2011 WL 5548708, at *27.
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Concepcion, state courts could regulate the use of arbitration agreements
by enforcing only those deemed fair to consumers and consistent with
state policy. The FAA was the business community's response to this
judicial hostility, Congress's way of telling the states to stop meddling in
the affairs of the business community.
The Concepcion decision is already changing the relationship between state regulators and corporations in the area of consumer protection. According to David Arkush, a consumer advocate with Public Citizen, "[c]orporations can now prevent consumers and small business
owners from exercising what is often their only real option for challenging companies that defraud them by millions or even billions of dollars:
banding together to file class action lawsuits."' 58 The decision has cast
doubt on dozens of state laws designed to protect consumers from the
harsh effects of arbitration. Among the laws now in question are class
action-waiver bars in Georgia, California, South Carolina, and New Jersey, as well as a West Virginia law prohibiting nursing homes from using
arbitration clauses in their admission agreements that strip residents of
their right to bring personal-injury claims to court.' 59
This is just a sample, drawn exclusively from Clement's caseload,
of pro-business outcomes that made life more difficult for the states and
their allies in the conservative legal movement. If you expand the inquiry
to the entire Supreme Court docket, more examples abound. In CSX
Transportation v. Alabama Department of Revenue,160 the Supreme
Court made it easier for interstate railroad companies to challenge state
tax laws under a federal statute prohibiting discriminatory taxes against
railroads.161 More recently, in National Meat Ass'n v. Harris,162 the
Court ruled that the Federal Meat Inspection Act preempted California's
restrictions on using non-ambulatory farm animals for slaughter.' 63 The
Chamber submitted a brief in support of the slaughterhouses.'6
More troubling for states' rights proponents is the fierceness with
which the Chamber is pursuing its agenda. Recall that the Reagan Administration wanted the Justice Department to push for a legal presumption favoring state and local regulations to the extent they conflict with
158.
David Arkush, U.S. Supreme Court to Major Corporations: You Write the Rules,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 28, 2011, 6:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-arkush/ussupreme-court-to-major b 854714.htmi.
159.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-110 (2012); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 56-15-130 (2012); W. VA. CODE R. § 16-5C-15(c) (2012); Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank,
912 A.2d 88, 99-101 (N.J. 2006); see also Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (1Ith Cir.)
(holding that, under Georgia law, such clauses are considered on a case-by-case basis).
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131 S. Ct. I101 (2011).
161.
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of Petitioner, Nat'l Meat, 132 S. Ct. at 965 (No. 10-224), 2011 WL 3821399.
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federal law. Charles Fried had opposed the idea, worried it would tip the
scale too far toward the states. Now the Chamber and its allies in the
business community are pushing in the opposite direction, inviting the
Court to abandon the "presumption against preemption," which requires
courts to assume a state law is valid in the absence of an affirmative
showing that it conflicts with federal law.' 6 5 The presumption is an outgrowth of the principle that state power is meant to protect state law from
the displacing effect of federal regulation. Doing away with it would tip
the scale even further in the business lobby's favor, eliminating one of
the states' most powerful defenses in preemption litigation.
These developments belie Clement's assurance that the two schools
of thought can work in harmony. If the Chamber were sensitive to the
interests of the states-if it were motivated even in part by conservative
unity-it would seek narrow holdings in preemption cases. But more
often than not, when the Chamber appears before the Supreme Court, it
is pushing not only for a business-friendly outcome but also for profederal doctrinal change that will endure beyond the particular dispute.
The Chamber will not be satisfied to advance its cause in a piecemeal,
case-by-case fashion. It wants to create a legal environment conducive to
broad federal power and uniform federal regulation.
It appears to be doing just that. The federal courts are gradually
changing the division of labor between Congress and the states, enlarging Congress's license to legislate in policy areas once reserved for state
legislatures. This shift is consistent with one. commentator's belief that
the Chamber is not simply trying to secure favorable outcomes for its
members; it's trying to set the "intellectual foundation for a newly muscular preemption jurisprudence."' 66
Consider how the two sides positioned themselves on the defining
issues of the term-healthcare and immigration. While the states' rights
movement rallied behind the opponents of the Affordable Care Act, staking its position in a series of fiery briefs from organizations like the Cato
Institute, Project Liberty, and the American Legislative Exchange Council, the Chamber kept a safe distance from the case. Although the Chamber filed two amicus briefs in the Supreme Court, neither took a position
on the law's constitutionality.' 67 The Chamber wrote only to stress the
importance of a prompt resolution, and to suggest that if the individual
mandate is struck down, the rest of the Affordable Care should fall with
it, because when push comes to shove, the Chamber's members would
165. See Tom Goldstein, Argument Preview: Will 'Presumption Against Preemption' Survive?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 7, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/201 1/1 l/argument-previewwill-%E2%80%9Cpresumption-against-preemption%E2%80%9D-survive/.
166.
Franklin, supra note 120, at 1033.
167. See Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Reversal as to the Severability Issue, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
(Nos. 11-393, 11-398, 11400), 2012 WL 454626 (combining and briefing the cases).
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prefer the status quo to the hollowed-out mess of a health care policy that
would remain in the absence of the mandate.' 6 8
The Chamber was altogether absent from the Arizona immigration
case, but if the position it took in a similar case last term is any indication, it probably would have aligned itself with the Obama Administration. In Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,169 the Chamber asserted that
the Legal Arizona Workers Act interferes with federal immigration policy by imposing more onerous penalties than federal law on businesses
that employ illegal aliens.170 There is such a thing, the Chamber maintained, as a state that's too cooperative in enforcing federal law. The Supreme Court ultimately sided with Arizona, concluding the State had
"taken the route least likely to cause tension with federal law."' 7 ' But the
Chamber's objection was clear: allowing states to determine for themselves whether someone is employing an unlawful alien frustrates federal
law and leaves businesses at the mercy of fifty independent and potentially conflicting enforcement regimes.172
This, I think, is what Professor Tushnet meant when he said the
business community is operating "outside the conservative legal movement's institutional framework."173 Healthcare and immigration were
indispensable opportunities for states' rights proponents. Winning either
case would have lifted the besieged movement from a decade-long slump
and dealt a devastating blow to the Obama Administration and its vision
of federal power. The conservative "institutional framework," with its
elaborate network of think tanks, advocacy groups, and public-interest
law firms, mobilized accordingly. The campaign was unyielding: signs
were hoisted, editorials submitted, briefs filed. Meanwhile, the Chamber
kept quiet. The Chamber had no position on the constitutionality of the
Affordable Care Act, at least none it felt comfortable detailing in an amicus brief. And it had already telegraphed its position on Arizona immigration, in the Whiting case, when it sued Arizona on the same profederal theory the Justice Department was using this time around.
IV. THE BIG TENT
Professor Young, who has written extensively on federalism and
conservative political theory, argues that legal conservatism would be
adrift were it not for its devotion to federalism.174 Young believes fidelity
to the framers' vision of a balance between state and federal power is
168.
Id. at 2, 15-16.
131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
169.
170. Brief for the Petitioners at 13-15, Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1968 (No. 09-115), 2008 WL
2131124,at*13-15.
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1987.
171.
172. See id. at 1979.
Tushnet, supra note 102, at 456.
173.
174. See Young, supra note 117, at 886-87.
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reason enough for conservatives to keep federalism near to their
hearts. 175 He maintains that limitations on centralized power can safeguard individual liberty, and that using the states as laboratories for political reform "fits the conservative view that change is both essential and
dangerous."' 7 6 In making the conservative case for federalism, Young
hopes to "provide principled reasons for a conservative court to favor
federalism and to remind conservatives why they ought to be more consistent in that cause."' 77
Young's argument provides a useful starting point, but so far it has
not found an audience outside academia, where it is needed most. Writing last year in Slate, Dahlia Lithwick and Barry Friedman observed that
"federalism cases have always made . .. fickle friends."l 7 8 "They put
people in an awkward spot," the authors wrote.1 79 "Either choose some
rule regarding state (versus federal) power and apply it no matter what
issue is at stake, or pick an outcome you like on any given issue, then
assign governmental power." 8 0 Lithwick and Friedman were addressing
the tension between federalism and the conservative social agenda, a
conflict that has left Republicans in the uncomfortable position of paying
lip service to states' rights while defending invasive federal programs
like the war on drugs and DOMA. But their criticism is also true of the
tension between federalism and deregulation.
The conflict, simply stated, is this: giving states more regulatory authority requires accepting the consequences of more regulation, whereas
pushing for regulatory uniformity at the federal level requires accepting a
circumscribed role for the states. The two schools of thought cannot exist
without tension in a national market economy, but there has always been
a flickering hope that their proponents might stay out of each other's way
in the greater interest of the movement. This hope has faded over the last
decade with the prospect of a united conservative legal movement giving
way to the reality that two of its main components, the business community and the states' rights movement, no longer share an agenda.
The Federalist Society took off in the 1980s because it found a way
to attract lawyers from a range of political and intellectual backgrounds.
It billed itself as a "big tent" institution, a place where conservatives
could come together to share fruit plates and listen to people like Paul
Clement talk about how much they have in common. This worked well
175. See id.
176. Id at 886.
177. Id. at 887.
178. Barry Friedman & Dahlia Lithwick, The Supreme Court Rediscovers FederalismJust in
Time
for
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(Dec.
14,
2011,
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three decades ago when conservatives were living in the shadow of the
Warren Court, with the legal academy still overrun by liberals. But as the
movement gained strength, infiltrating the very institutions it once opposed, the impulse that once united its factions grew fainter. Today legal
conservatism is said to encompass the same assorted membership as it
did thirty years ago, even though the forces that once united it have dissipated and the movement's various components have sought out their
own identities and agendas.
We see this trend at work in the media's portrayal of Paul Clement.
Both sides of the conflict would claim him as their own, even though
history shows him to be beholden to neither. The best one can say for the
standard trope about Clement is that it is right for the wrong reason.
Clement is the go-to lawyer for the conservative legal agenda, but it does
not follow that his success will advance the goals of legal conservatism,
writ large. Call him a states' rights crusader and you're forced to reconcile his preemption work on behalf of the business lobby. Call him a shill
of the business community and you're forced to account for his states'
rights work, much of it in tension with the business community's vision
of federal power. You can look to the common denominator and call him
a "conservative," but then you're right back where you started, left with a
label whose meaning has been stretched beyond usefulness.

